Room to Manoeuvre: Challenges of Linking Humanitarian Action and Post-Conflict Recovery in the New Global Security Environment by Abby Stoddard and Adele Harmer
Room to Manoeuvre: Challenges of 
Linking Humanitarian Action and Post-
Conflict Recovery in the New Global 
Security Environment 
 
Stoddard, Abby, and Adele Harmer. 2005. 






Room to Maneuver  
The Challenges of Linking Humanitarian Action 












Abby  Stoddard     Adele  Harmer 
Center on International  Cooperation    Humanitarian  Policy  Group 
New  York  University      Overseas  Development  Institute 
abby.stoddard@nyu.edu     aharmer@odi.org.uk 
 
418 Lafayette Street, Suite 543, New York, NY 10003   1
Summary: Humanitarian challenges in conflict and post-conflict scenarios 
 
Humanitarian providers play vital roles in countries undergoing and emerging from 
conflict, filling crucial needs and representing an important part of the international work 
toward stabilization and recovery.   Never a politically simple matter, despite the 
apolitical humanitarian ideal, the policies and practices of humanitarian action now face 
new and intensified challenges in the current international environment. 
 
One set of challenges has to do with the uncertain role of humanitarian actors in 
transitional or post-conflict situations.  International assistance actors have arrived at 
some points of consensus regarding what makes effective programming in transitions, 
and the necessary shift from life-saving to life-normalizing and life-improving 
interventions.  However, dilemmas arise regarding how to preserve an independent 
humanitarian presence within a broader political mission, and whether and how 
humanitarians are to engage with state structures, political actors, and militaries.  
 
Following on from these issues is the more pointed debate over the erosion of neutral 
humanitarian space as a result of recent political and security developments.  The US-led 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), situations of asymmetric warfare and counter-
insurgency operations, and the increased blending of civil and military responses have 
created an environment in which humanitarians see their core neutrality principle 
increasingly compromised. 
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And finally, at the most immediate level, humanitarian actors struggle also with the 
erosion of their physical security – most certainly in the cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and possibly as a general trend.  Whether the risk of violence for humanitarian actors has 
increased over time is not yet known definitively, pending a comprehensive compiling 
and analysis of the data.  What is not in question, however, is that the UN organizational 
response to the security challenge has had major implications for its own agencies’ 
humanitarian access and methods of operations in some places, and is creating ripple 
effects throughout the entire humanitarian system.     
 
 
I. Uncertain terms: Securing an independent humanitarian role in transitions and 
other “non-emergency” contexts 
 
Over the past several years, international political and assistance actors arrived at a 
shared understanding on some key principles regarding the relationship of humanitarian 
action and recovery efforts in conflict-affected states.   Among the points of this informal 
consensus were the necessity of safeguarding a humanitarian space for neutral assistance 
efforts, importance of maintaining a “light footprint” of the international community, and, 
once the acute crisis has passed, shifting the focus of international aid efforts away from 
direct service delivery to partnering and mentoring relationships with local state and civil 
institutions.  The primary goal of assistance in these scenarios is to strengthen local 
governance to help shore up the fragile peace and prevent a slide back into conflict and 
crisis.   
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The international community has been slow to operationalize this consensus around 
transitional assistance. It presents a formidable challenge for a number of reasons, among 
them the multiplicity of actors and mandates involved, and a lack of clarity around 
whether and how the humanitarian and development communities have a shared agenda 
in assistance strategies.    
 
Humanitarian Action and Post-Conflict Recovery: Competing or complementary 
agendas?   
The international aid community’s thinking on transitions during the previous decade 
centered on the need to bridge the funding and operational gap that typically arose 
between emergency aid and normal development programming.
1  These efforts resulted 
in few concrete changes in the funding area, largely because the donor government 
architecture was itself split between relief and development assistance, and resistant to 
change.
2   
 
The gap concept implied a chronological continuum between relief and development 
phases, which international aid actors later dismissed as overly simplistic.  However, the 
fundamental problem they identified remained: countries transitioning to peace and state-
building efforts received inadequate and/or misdirected aid resources, with much of it 
flowing to the international community’s aid efforts rather than into local capacity; 
people saw little or no evidence of their daily lives improving; and fledgling state 
institutions lacked the capacity and legitimacy required to steer the nation to stability and 
development.  The track record of post conflict recovery efforts bears out the worst-case   4
scenario predictions.  The World Bank cites recent research showing 50 percent of post-
conflict countries fall back into conflict within five years, and evidence points to slow 
and spotty disbursements of pledged contributions as a major factor in the failure of 
reconstruction and descent back into war.
3  
 
A joint working group of UN agencies and offices engaged in development and 
humanitarian affairs (UNDG-ECHA) began work on transitions in 2002.  The group 
agreed on a working definition of transition as "the period in crisis when external 
assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile cease fires or peace 
processes by helping create the conditions for political stability, security, justice and 
social equality."  It emphasizes the fragility of the post-conflict environment and the need 
to work with and through national authorities, lending them credibility and legitimacy, 
and providing technical and financial support as they take on crucial governance 
functions.  The ultimate aim of transition is consolidating peace, which requires a broader 
variety of actors, including the World Bank and other IFIs, the political arms of the UN, 
donors, and aid agencies, as well as new modalities such as trust funds.
4 
 
In transitions, UN aid agencies see not only underserved needs, but also a niche 
opportunity to expand their programming at a time when their service delivery role is 
increasingly called into question in difficult security environments.  However, the 
transition issue raises problems for the broader community of humanitarian actors.   For 
one thing, the community lacks a common definition of itself.  Until recently, there were 
no clear, shared parameters for what constitutes humanitarian action.  Indeed, the trend   5
over the past decade has been to expand the humanitarian concept to encompass a wider 
range of activities and allow for more actors to find a place at the humanitarian table.  
The most direct cause for the expanding “humanitarian” sphere may be found in the large 
flows of donor aid to high profile emergencies, and the desire of UN development 
agencies to tap into these resources and establish themselves as players early on in the 
crisis.  In the competitive environment that exists within the UN system of agencies and 
larger aid community, to do otherwise is to risk marginalization.  In the view of many 
humanitarians, however, this represents an unhelpful development, as it dilutes the 
existing consensus that humanitarian action is a special category of assistance with 
objectives and protections that need to remain distinct.  Under the Good Humanitarian 
Donorship initiative launched in Stockholm in 2003, efforts have begun among donors 
and other stakeholders to reach a common definition of humanitarian action for the 
immediate purpose of tracking and reporting aid flows within the OECD/DAC.  While 
this signals a positive shift in policy approaches, there are a number of challenges in 
measuring the realization of this goal. 
5 
 
Twin features of developing country crises that emerged in the post-Cold War period are 
the weakened or outright failed state apparatus on the one hand, and the increasing 
importance of non-state actors (NSAs) such as rebel groups, warlords/militias, as well as 
indigenous NGOs on the other.  The UN has maintained an important, if not central, role 
in international humanitarian response, but as an institution remains constitutionally 
state-centered in its mission and conduct in country.
6  The UN Resident Coordinators, the 
senior officials in developing countries have at times been reluctant to declare   6
humanitarian emergencies or highlight human rights abuses for fear of damaging 
diplomatic relations and development partnerships with the host government.   
International NGOs enjoy more flexibility in this regard, but there are also tensions for 
multi-mandated agencies with both developmental and humanitarian objectives. NGOs 
also run the real risk of exacerbating political tensions by engaging directly with one 
group of belligerents or another, and as a community lack common benchmarks on what 
are the necessary conditions for their continued operational presence.  In situations of 
transition, UN and NGO humanitarians alike face difficult decisions as to who, beyond 
the state, are the appropriate interlocutors in terms of advancing humanitarian concerns. 
 
Protracted crises 
Post-conflict transitions represent just one of two scenarios in which humanitarian actors 
operate where there is currently no acute, widespread emergency, but where there still 
may be pockets or instances of urgent humanitarian need.  The other is in the case of 
protracted crisis, known as “chronic emergencies” or, as some have termed them, 
“complex development scenarios.”  In these cases – Sudan, Angola, Liberia, and pre-9/11 
Afghanistan are among the examples - development is stalled, the state may be failed or 
failing, the population or certain groups are especially vulnerable, and there is the 
constant threat of new violence and/or major humanitarian crisis.  The international 
community has yet to expend serious effort on addressing the special nature and needs of 
countries characterized by this phenomenon.  These country cases, some entering their 
second decade of “emergency” status, run a major risk of donor fatigue and further 
waning of public attention, and stand to benefit greatly from an infusion of new ideas and   7
approaches to their limbo status.  Aid practitioners in such countries such as argue that a 
new framework is needed for addressing these long-running emergencies that clearly fall 
between the CAP and the UNDAF frameworks but nonetheless have areas or population 
groups facing extreme vulnerabilities and urgent needs. 
  
International actors have also not yet developed a shared strategy on how address the 
weakened capacities of governments and populations in southern Africa caused by the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, or the conflict systems perpetuated by illicit economies. The 
principal policy response to these challenges has been to expand the definition of 
emergency and insert development organizations into the humanitarian sphere.
7  This 
again ascribes at least in part to the rigidity of donor agency structures and the fact that 
any contributions to aid countries under corrupt, failing or repressive governments must 
be classified as emergency relief to circumvent government control of the aid resources.  
At the same time, there has not been a great deal of programming innovations from the 
field either, as the organization tendency is for agencies to “stick to their knitting” when 
confronted with new and uncertain states of affairs.   The bureaucratic and daily 
operational constraints have thus arguably constrained innovative thinking around these 
situations.  
 
The UN and the future of integrated missions 
Until 1992, UN peacekeeping and assistance activities were entirely separate, and there 
was little coordination even among the UN agencies within the humanitarian sphere.   
Widespread dissatisfaction over the competitive and duplicative inter-agency structure in   8
humanitarian efforts led to the passage of Resolution 46/182 - a major step towards 
recognizing the importance of a more coordinated humanitarian system that includes the 
roles played by humanitarian NGOs as well as UN agencies.   
 
In 1994 the first Humanitarian Coordinator was appointed in Somalia.  Over the years 
some of the more effective HCs have brought NGOs, as well as donors and local actors, 
into the field-based dialogue with the UN actors, in arrangements sometimes referred to 
as “Country Team-plus.”   Gradually, in increasing numbers of countries, these non-UN 
actors were brought into a common discussion on planning and operations, and this has 
been credited with significantly improved overall humanitarian response in these 
countries. 
 
The UN reform package of 1997, however, inadvertently undercut the growing cohesion 
in the broader humanitarian sphere by promoting greater intra-UN cohesion between the 
political, peacekeeping, development, and humanitarian departments.  Driving the reform 
package as it related to field operations were pointed critiques of the UN’s performance 
in problem states, and the particular dissatisfaction of member governments not only with 
costly duplication of support structures for each agency, but also with and what they saw 
as the fragmented political presence of UN.  Members demanded the UN begin to speak 
with a single voice in these situations.  Enter the concept of the integrated mission, led by 
a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) exercising “authority over all 
UN entities in the field,”
8 and “whereby all UN resources are harnessed under common   9
direction towards consolidating peace and supporting the re-establishment of stable and 
legitimate central government with viable institutions.”
9  
 
Humanitarian NGOs (who are effectively shut out of this process), as well as some UN 
humanitarian agencies resist the movement toward integrated missions for the same 
reason they sought a separate Humanitarian Coordinator independent of the UN 
diplomatic presence in a country – to shield humanitarian action from the constraining 
effects of political considerations.   These actors do not discount the benefits of 
coordination and complementary activities, rather it is the fear of that the humanitarian 
agenda will become subsumed by or secondary to political and peacekeeping goals.  As 
one observer put it, “In effect 'integration' may serve to undermine humanitarian action 
by transforming it from a fundamental and inalienable right of those in need into simply 
another tool of diplomacy.”
10  NGOs have called attention to the situation in a number of 
countries including, Angola and Liberia, as to  how integration can hinder humanitarian 
action.  In Angola, the rebel movement UNITA collapsed, hundreds of thousands of 
people streamed out of the former UNITA-held areas, and were in fairly desperate need 
of assistance.  MSF identified the need for a straightforward aid response, but claimed 
that because the UN and donor community did not push the Angolan government for 
increased access for humanitarian responders, thousands of lives were lost.  MSF reports 
that the UN went so far as to ask some donors not to fund individual agencies for rapid 
response, but to wait until the full community could go in together under a coordinated 
structure.  Aid was thus held hostage to political agenda.
11 
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The case of Liberia is also cited often by the anti-integrated mission camp as a particular 
failure from the standpoint of humanitarian concerns,
12 and certain NGOs have held it up 
as a reason they will not participate in other integrated mission frameworks elsewhere.  
Many NGOs in Liberia were unhappy with UNAMIL’s incorporation of the 
Humanitarian Coordinator role (as a dual function of the DSRSG) as well as OCHA into 
the integrated mission framework.   
“This step, which could be seen as the final step in realizing the full 
integration of humanitarian coordination under a political banner, may 
involve humanitarian concerns becoming subservient to the political 
process and/or the UN neglecting immediate humanitarian needs. The 
coordination of humanitarian action needs, however, its own humanitarian 
space.”
13    
 
Others hope that the presence of the humanitarian function within UNAMIL will raise the 
profile of humanitarian issues among political actors in the mission.  The lack of 
consensus among the NGOs as to whether the costs of integration outweigh its benefits is 
itself damaging to humanitarian coordination.  
 
There are some in the UN who support a flexible and case-based approach to applying 
the integrated mission framework.  Their reasoning holds that integrated missions are to 
be used when possible, humanitarian independence when necessary (for instance in cases 
active conflict).  In past experience, however, the UN has not had much success in 
establishing criteria to guide case-based decision-making, but like all large organizations 
naturally veers toward a default management structure.  Additionally, amid the current 
concerns for staff security, the push for integrated missions in all contexts promises to 
grow stronger, as security favors a centralized command structure. 
   11
 
Political and operational challenges of multi-mandated agencies in engaging across the 
‘divide’ 
Emergency humanitarian assistance exists outside the human development paradigm.  It 
often involves the provision of non-renewable, non-sustainable aid inputs meant as 
stopgap for emergency needs.  Although it is to be avoided as a rule, humanitarian 
emergencies sometimes necessitate the creation of parallel mechanisms, such as 
temporary schools, health clinics, and civil administration institutions.  Humanitarian 
action is inherently direct and grassroots, targeted at individuals and communities while 
circumventing authorities. 
 
While its practitioners may agree that humanitarian action represents a special category 
of assistance, the vast majority of assistance entities are in fact multi-mandated 
organizations, with programs spanning humanitarian relief, recovery, and development 
activities.  The challenge to these agencies, is deciding when to make the shift from direct 
aid provision to partnerships in peace- and nation-building.  Ideally this should be based 
on accurate assessments of needs and conditions on the ground, but political and funding 
considerations are often at play as well.  The prevalence of integrated missions has in 
some sense taken the decision away from the individual agency, centralizing decision-
making for UN agencies and requiring NGOs to choose between either operating within 
or outside the system or to leave (MSF in Afghanistan ultimately did both, as discussed 
further below).  At the heart of this dilemma in highly contested environments is the issue   12
of humanitarian neutrality, which, as the next section illustrates, has moved from the 




II. Humanitarian action in the post-9/11 environment: Challenges to neutrality 
 
The US-led global security agenda embodied in GWOT has created a new framework for 
the conduct of international relations with fragile states, which are now viewed as 
potential harbors and staging grounds for global militant Islamist networks. This interest 
has been driven on another level by a renewed interest in reaching the Millennium 
Development Goals as an expression of pro-poor policies, and recognition of the failure 
of sanctions and conditionality policies. In this way the west has reversed its policy of 
disengagement from many of those developing countries that had ceased to be of 
strategic interest during the post-Cold War period (at least in principle, if not yet in 
practice).
14  Moreover, western governments are beginning to look at the linkages 
between aid, stable states, and security.  In this context humanitarian aid and recovery 
assistance has become integral to the security agenda, and is seen as a “soft” tool, to be 
used in combination with political and military instruments, to achieve counter-terror 
objectives. 
 
The evolving relationship between aid and counter-terrorism efforts   
Several donor governments have adopted policy changes reflecting a more coherent 
approach to the failed states-security linkage.  Conflict, insecurity, and weak   13
governments have come to be seen as causes of poverty as well as the reverse.  Trade, aid 
(both relief and development), and defense policy are all seen as important and linked 
components of combating global terror.  In the UN system, the concept of “human 
security” presaged the integration of hard and soft international instruments now playing 
out under GWOT.  The human security agenda is concerned with the security of people 
within states, requires international and multidisciplinary efforts, and sovereignty is 
respected conditionally contingent on the state protecting its citizens and meeting its 
responsibilities.  It is based on the merging of the human development concept with 
theories of conflict causation and prevention.
15 
 
Perhaps the most striking change from previous periods can be seen in the reinforcement 
of a trend in political instrumentalism, some would say co-option of humanitarian 
assistance.  In countries where security interests are seen most clearly at stake, 
humanitarian assistance has gone from being the sole embodiment of the international 
response to a feature of the securitization and peace-building process.  The securitization 
of aid is also reflected in the greater emphasis of Afghanistan PRT model of the military 
performing aid work as part of or in addition to their normal duties. 
 
This first became apparent in Afghanistan.  NGOs previously open to dialoguing with the 
military found their arguments for the importance of their independence and neutrality 
had limited impact, as US forces took on new small scale aid endeavors, and 
administration officials spoke of humanitarian NGOs as “force multipliers.”
16  According   14
to the US NGOs, the latest crop of senior officers has not shown interest in NGO 
concerns
17  an estrangement that has continued and solidified in Iraq. 
 
The NGO Médecins sans Frontières, renowned for working under the most difficult and 
dangerous of conditions, regretfully but pointedly withdrew their staff from Afghanistan 
in June 2004 after the unsolved ambush and murder of five of their staff, and a few 
months later withdrew from Iraq.  The reasons they cited were intolerable security 
conditions, which in Afghanistan was due in large part to the US military forces 
assumption of the humanitarian mantle, traveling in unmarked vehicles in civilian 
clothes, carrying concealed weapons, and identifying themselves as humanitarians or “on 
a humanitarian mission,” all in violation of the Geneva Convention.  MSF has reported 
that their Afghan contacts warned them repeatedly not to go to certain places lest they be 
mistaken for coalition soldiers.
18  The increased engagement of private sector actors, 
including private security firms and even vigilantes and bounty hunters operating outside 
any legitimate auspices, has added to the confusion.  
 
One must use caution in ascribing the developments in the Afghanistan and Iraq cases - 
both highly complex and irregular diplomatic environments - to a universal shift in great 
power policy that harnesses humanitarian activities to political ends.  For although the 
GWOT does appear to lay down a global blueprint for dealing with unstable developing 
states, thus far there is no evidence of a universal application of these new policies.  
Rather, some have observed what appears to be an emerging two-tier system of 
emergencies, with countries of particular concern to counter-terror operations on the one   15
hand, versus vs. “normal” humanitarian crises on the other.
19  In first tier countries, such 
as Iraq and Afghanistan, three features are evident: first, great power security interests are 
predominant and all other aspects of politics and assistance are drafted to these ends; 
second, massive new private sector involvement has emerged in the reconstruction effort, 
including some areas – such as education and health – traditionally considered the 
province of humanitarian actors; and third, individual humanitarian actors such as UN 
agencies and NGOs face greater pressures and ethical dilemmas, as well as greater 
physical risk from those who target them as agents of the western power structure.   
Elsewhere in the world, the “second tier” emergency countries such as Sudan and Liberia 
continue to conform to an older paradigm, where aid per capita remains relatively low 
and aid workers are seen as benign and for the most part not deliberately targeted.  Sudan 
warrants particular mention in this context, for although the regime has been labeled as 
terrorist-supporting, and the conflict involves issues of Islamic and Arabic identity, aid 
workers see the situation much more along the lines of business-as-usual.
20   
 
Though overall government expenditures for first tier emergency countries is much 
higher, driven by large reconstruction contracts with for-profit contractors,
21 there is to 
date no conclusive evidence to suggest that humanitarian actors in these crises are being 
deprived of usual funding; nor are humanitarian emergencies elsewhere in the world 
receiving lower amounts as a result of diversion of funding to areas of geo-strategic 
interests.  
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Humanitarian action under occupation: principles and perceptions 
According to the Geneva Conventions, the occupying power is primarily responsible for 
aid to civilians and reconstruction in the post-conflict occupied country.  In the case of 
Iraq however, the international humanitarian system geared up and initially began 
operations as per previous emergencies.  The scenario that unfolded on the ground made 
clear that the Iraq case involved many complex choices and challenges for the 
humanitarian implementing organizations, particularly in the absence of major 
displacements or critical humanitarian need. 
 
Many (mainly US-based) NGOs, for their part, made the conscious choice to participate 
within a Pentagon-led reconstruction effort in Iraq, some say as the inexorable result of 
pre-war fundraising and mobilization in anticipation of a major humanitarian disaster.  
This choice created ethical and operational problems for these organizations as well as 
significant security challenges.  Most of the NGOs entering Iraq after the US takeover did 
not have the longstanding ground presence in Iraq that would afford them the familiarity 
of local populations and the communications networks to elicit crucial security 
information.  Rather, they entered a highly uncertain situation where they were inevitably 
closely identified with the coalition occupation and reconstruction efforts.  More so than 
the NGOs, the UN found itself in an extremely difficult position in Iraq.  It too was 
identified with the occupying power, and had already been the target of much popular 
resentment for its role in enforcing the 12-year sanctions regime.   There was no clear 
understanding internally or between the UN and the coalition leaders about what the 
UN’s post-war role would be, and how, precisely, it would relate to the occupying power,   17
beyond taking up part of the burden for reconstruction.  The horrific bombing of the UN 
offices in Baghdad on 19 August 2003 drove home the precariousness and the ambiguity 
of the UN’s position in the country.  
 
In the aftermath of 19 August and the subsequent bombing of the ICRC’s offices there 
has been a great deal of discussion as to whether these entities were targeted because they 
were seen as allies of the coalition, or whether they were merely convenient targets to 
create an atmosphere of disorder and terror, disrupting the effort to reconstruct and 
stabilize Iraq.  The bombings assuredly accomplished the latter, and their ramifications 
are being felt throughout the UN system. 
 
Potential responses for humanitarian providers 
In most country cases the dilemmas do not present themselves quite so starkly as the 
MSF pullout from Afghanistan, but humanitarian actors operating in the most highly 
insecure environments find themselves between the proverbial rock and a hard place.  
They face pressures by western governments to conform to their broader security agenda, 
and by the UN to participate in integrated missions, yet to do so they believe they would 
be contributing to their own insecurity – essentially setting themselves up as targets.  In 
addition they see it as betraying the humanitarian principles central to their mission. 
Potential approaches in such situations are few and underdeveloped.  They include the 
traditionalist or “back-to-basics” approach now being promoted by MSF that seeks to 
reinforce the separateness of humanitarian action from political agendas.  This approach 
calls for humanitarians to remain outside the dialogue on political and peace-building   18
affairs, to focus efforts on meeting needs in the most narrowly defined scope 
humanitarian action.
22  Notwithstanding its birthright as an outspoken advocate for 
victims rights to humanitarian aid, MSF seems to have come to the conclusion that when 
advocacy crosses the line into policy prescription humanitarian principles are 
compromised; and when humanitarian efforts and actors are coordinated under a broader 
international response, humanitarian action invariably becomes a tool of political 
agendas.
23  MSF has thus declared its policy of speaking only within its field of expertise, 
and only calling for military intervention, for example, in cases of genocide.  
 
An alternate approach offered by a representative of CARE argues that rather than 
“depoliticizing humanitarianism” the humanitarian community should work actively 
toward “humanitarianizing politics.”
 24  In other words, humanitarian organizations would 
do better to adopt a politically attuned, rights-based approach that resists co-option by 
any political party, while actively engaging with governments to hold them responsible 
for meeting the humanitarian needs of civilians in crisis. 
25    
 
A third alternative, that is only just beginning to be raised in this context, though it is as 
old as any debate in humanitarianism, is the question of indigenization of humanitarian 
response.  Some, though certainly not all, of the dilemmas touched on by this paper could 
be avoided if humanitarian response did not rely on the international, northern-based 
system of aid implementers and donors.  In this line of thinking, humanitarianism must 
do more than merely de-westernize its “face,” but thoroughly devolve its institutions and 
response capacities to national and regional entities.   19
 
Humanitarian-military relations: New strains on an uncomfortable coexistence 
Beginning with the Kurdish displacement crisis on Northern Iraq in 1991 military forces 
and humanitarian actors found themselves increasingly thrown together in developing 
country crises, and began a dialogue on issues surrounding their coexistence and 
cooperation in humanitarian emergency settings. 
26 The common understanding they 
reached held there were areas of complementarity between the two sets of actors; that 
flexible and case-based cooperation was possible; and there was an urgent need for 
greater mutual understanding of roles and objectives, and of where they do and do not 
overlap.   Central to this consensus was the point that the key role of the military actors, 
where they were present in humanitarian crises, was in “fostering security and creating 
the space to enable humanitarian organizations to carry out their work.”
27  This was seen 
as acknowledging the comparative advantage of each set of actors while not seeing the 
humanitarian effort as an arm of the military operations, nor treating the military as a 
logistics service contractor for the humanitarians.  This point was reflected in certain 
examples of national military doctrine.
28  For example, British doctrine enshrines the 
separateness of the humanitarian and military spheres, wherein mutual reinforcement 
between the humanitarian and the political is occasional, not inevitable.  
 
The NGO community has never had universal consensus regarding relations with the 
military, and they have behaved in contradictory ways.  There were and are those among 
them who maintain that fundamental humanitarian principles are inevitably compromised 
in a collaborative relationship with the military, and that humanitarians have no business   20
calling for military intervention in a crisis country for humanitarian reasons unless it is to 
halt a genocide.   Disagreements between NGOs over whether and to what extent to 
cooperate with military forces have complicated humanitarian coordination in Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia, and in Tsunami-affected Indonesia, among other cases.   
Information sharing, so crucial in emergency contexts has suffered when some NGOs 
have chosen to withhold what they know rather than share it with other agencies who are 
cooperating with and feeding information to the military.  NGOs who choose not to avail 
themselves of military armed escorts resent those who do, fearing the association will 
taint the whole of the NGO community.  Nonetheless, over the past decade most NGOs 
and UN agencies will and have worked in cooperation or coordination with military 
forces in conflicts and post-conflict scenarios.  Successful communication and 
coexistence has depended largely on the personalities involved and the civil-military 
liaison structures they established at the field level.   
 
The undoing of the nascent 1990s consensus has been among the major shifts in the 
humanitarian landscape under the new counter-terror global security agenda, as even the 
US-based humanitarian actors are faced with a “sea change”
29 in the political-military 
actors’ relationship to the humanitarian sphere.  Recent attempts by European 
governments to establish more policy-based frameworks for civilian-military dialogue 




III. The security challenge and its implications for humanitarian operations  
   21
Though it has not yet been determined with statistical certainty, it is widely held that 
casualty levels among aid workers have increased significantly over the years, 
particularly in the post 9-11 period.  Until a denominator can be calculated representing 
the number of relief workers operating in the field in a given year, it remains unclear 
whether the level of risk to this work has increased, or if there are simply more workers 
in the field experiencing a corresponding number of dangerous incidents.  In any event, 
as organizations perceived their staff to be increasingly directly affected by violence, 
humanitarian security has risen in importance and sophistication.   The 
professionalization and standards movement that swept the community of humanitarian 
organizations included security planning and management as a key feature.   
Organizations began differentiating the area of personnel safety (e.g. common sense 
guidelines preventing vehicle accidents and illness) from the more complex issue of 
security (targeted violence, acts of war) that required greater resources and skills, and a 
strategic approach that encompassed the whole of programming.
31   
 
It is not uncommon now for the largest UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs to lose five 
or more staff members a year to violence in the field.  Among the most common causes 
of casualties to aid workers are banditry on the roads (ambushes with beatings or killings, 
car-jackings or simple robbery); landmines; kidnappings; and in some cases armed 
attacks on premises or aerial bombardment.  In addition there is the risk of common 
crime for which aid workers are often identifiable and appealing targets.  Local staff or 
contractors, especially drivers hauling relief supplies, continue to bear the brunt of the 
violent incidents, but the threat to international staff is also perceived to have risen over   22
the past decade, particularly in the rise of cases of kidnapping/hostage taking. Along with 
physical risks go the very real psychological risks and aftereffects to humanitarian 
workers.  Post-traumatic stress disorder, “burnout”, and vicarious traumatization (i.e. 
witnessing violence and atrocities against others) are growing problems among field staff, 
and detrimental to aid work in multiple ways.   
 
Evolving policies and practices in humanitarian security  
International humanitarian actors have attempted to counter the security challenge with a 
variety of mechanisms.  Security has perhaps been the biggest factor in driving 
interagency coordination in the field, and at the headquarters level with joint training 
efforts.  Traditionally the theory of enhancing the security of aid workers was based on 
the “security triangle” paradigm, comprised of three crucial components, emphasized to 
varying degrees by different types of organizations.  The first, protection seeks to reduce 
vulnerability, i.e. harden the target.  To this end humanitarian agencies have hired 
professionally trained security coordinators, provided training to staff members, and have 
invested in resources such as thick skinned vehicles, body armor, gates and alarms, 
communications equipment, and explosive-proof materials.   The second strategy, 
deterrence, entails presenting a counter threat, such as the presence of armed escorts or 
proximity to military forces.  The third, acceptance, is viewed by many in the NGO 
community as the most difficult yet most effective and principled means to reduce the 
threat to humanitarian actors.  It entails the aid agency working towards becoming a 
familiar and trusted entity by local communities at the ground level, cultivating a network 
of contacts and intermediaries to maintain open lines of communications with key parties,   23
and usually requires a long-term presence in country pre-, during, and post-conflict.   All 
three of these strategies require as their basis a detailed and thorough security assessment, 
which is undertaken prior to the mission and updated continually as conditions change.   
 
In the late 1990s and the past five years have seen new efforts in security enhancement of 
both UN agencies and NGOs, individually and jointly (through the major consortia and 
international networks such as RedR and People in Aid).  However, it has not resulted in 
a sense of greater comfort in field operations or any diminishment of the threat.  In recent 
years, as will be discussed more below, rather the opposite has occurred.  Although the 
major UN and NGO humanitarian actors universally concur on the importance of 
security, in actual practice the level of sophistication and investment into security 
measures varies enormously from one to another.  Despite general improvements, much 
remains to be done, particularly in the area of security training, for a constantly changing 
and peripatetic field staff.
32    National staff, moreover, although they represent the 
majority of victims, receive a disproportionately low share of the training and material 




The changing UN security regime and the phenomenon of “aid by remote control” 
In October 2003 the Secretary-General announced a plan to reconfigure, strengthen, and 
modernize the UN security apparatus - a process that has recently begun under the new 
Under Secretary General for the Department of Safety and Security.   At the same time he 
cautioned that the UN must not “succumb to a 'bunker mentality' and shrink from the   24
work the world's people expect it to do.”
34  Yet many of the organization’s humanitarian 
agencies and their partners fear this is precisely what has happened since the Canal Hotel 
bombing.   
 
One agency director noted that the Iraq bombing was pivotal, but the process had actually 
started before.  He warned that the UN was nearing the point where UN humanitarian 
action was beginning to resemble a national foreign service in its priorities – an example 
of a “force and fortress mentality” indeed.  The strongest critics have accused the UN of 
an institutional overreaction to the August 19 horror, and reminded that risk comes with 
the territory and will be greatest precisely where the UN presence is needed most.
35    
 
Senior officials at UNDSS emphasize that their role is to provide an “enabling” security 
environment for programming, not a restrictive one.  The department, with the help of 
over $3 million in new resources allocated by the UN’s General Assembly, is now 
struggling to staff up and modernize UN security in ways comparable to multinational 
corporations and banks, who find ways to continue operating and safeguard their 
personnel in the some of the most unstable situations.  The key to this endeavor is the 
concept of risk management analysis and strategy.  The centerpiece of the risk 
management framework in the field is the Security Risk Assessment (SRA), which takes 
as a starting point the agencies’ programming priorities and institutes the necessary 
security conditions to make these possible.    
   25
For their part, the agencies and NGOs note some early improvements in the UN security 
system along these lines, but charge that there are a great many UN security officers in 
the field yet who use evacuation as a principal security strategy and approach risk by 
restricting movement.  UNDSS officials regretfully admit that this mentality does persist 
among some of its field officers, but countercharge that the agencies too often don’t 
know what it is they want or need to do and make it inordinately difficult to engineer the 
security umbrella. 
 
The UN plays both a functional and a coordinating role in humanitarian and post-conflict 
scenarios, and to the extent that these roles are now being driven, or at least severely 
constrained, by security concerns in insecure environments has ripple effects on the entire 
humanitarian system.  Certain UN humanitarian officials lament that donors are recoiling 
from the high cost of additional security provisions, and NGOs are seeking to distance 
themselves as well to avoid the risk of association.
36  In extraordinarily high-risk 
environments like Iraq, even NGOs constrain the movements of their personnel, and by 
the time of this writing most have withdrawn from that country completely.  Without the 
NGOs as implementing partners, and unable to move about freely themselves, UN 
agencies and donor governments are also turning to private contractors to carry out aid 
delivery in the most rudimentary forms of assistance programming.  Humanitarian 
professionals in the UN and NGOs speak of the intense frustration with being confined to 
compounds or residences, hiring out aid services which cannot even be monitored 
visually but rely on telephone reports.  Local aid organizations are also typically counted 
on to fill the breech when the risks are too high for international implementers.  Yet in   26
high-risk counter-terror scenarios they face enormous hurdles as objects of suspicion as 
potential fronts for terrorist organizations, and as targets themselves.   
 
The relationship between the UN and NGOs on matters of security has, since the mid 
1990s, been a source of frustration and false starts.  In 1996 the UN Security Coordinator 
issued a Memorandum of Understanding for including NGOs in UN security 
arrangements – developed without any NGO input - that was rejected by NGOs as 
unacceptable.  While NGOs in principle are in favor of the UN playing a role in security 
coordination, they are unwilling to surrender operational independence and their own 
judgment on matters of security.  To many observers, the greater problem is the 
reluctance among many NGO to invest in, establish, and consistently implement security 
procedures.  Explanations for this reluctance include the conscious decision by some 
organizations to concentrate their finite resources on programming goals, simple 
inexperience or incompetence on the part of others, and still others not wanting to scare 
off potential field workers with an excess of talk and training centered on worst-case 
scenarios.   There is also a disconnect between donors’ expressions of willingness to fund 
additional security measures for their implementers’ programs, and many organizations’ 
doubts that such funding is available  - and their fears that requesting it would detract 
from their  programming capacity and/or competitiveness. 
 
Another trend signals a different sort of NGO reasoning.  In the post-9-11 political 
atmosphere, where humanitarians perceive a risk of targeting for their association with 
western interests, some organizations have moved even further toward an emphasis on   27
acceptance strategies and blending in to local communities as their best hope – even as 
the UN and other international entities invest more heavily on protection and deterrence 
measures.   
 
UN relief agencies also express concern that the emphasis on security within the 
framework of integrated missions threatens to paralyze UN humanitarian action.  UN 
humanitarian actors are increasingly forced to choose between being good team players 
in integrated missions and being an effective humanitarian presence in areas where both 




Real or perceived?  Assessing the risks to aid workers in the new global environment  
Are humanitarian workers at greater risk today than in previous years?  The widespread 
sense among humanitarian practitioners holds the answer to be a resounding yes.   
Afghanistan is readily singled out, as a country where more aid workers have been killed 
in the nearly four years since the coalition campaign than in the prior 20 years of war and 
strife in that country.  Iraq has seen a particularly terrifying trend of kidnappings and 
beheading of expatriate aid workers and contractors.  However it would be a mistake to 
draw definitive conclusions from these two exceptional cases. And data on the aid worker 
casualties remains soft and for the most part dependent on voluntary reporting. Various 
studies
38 published in the past have contained different parameters – some for instance 
including deaths caused by vehicle accidents and disease, some including UN 
peacekeepers to the tally, etc.  None of them have the figures to provide the denominator   28
– the number of aid workers in the field – an important consideration given the changing 
size of the humanitarian presence in insecure areas.  In terms of total numbers, however, 
the short-term trend in violence against aid workers does appear to be on the rise.   
 
Table 1: Aid workers affected by major violent incidents 1997-2004 
  Total  UN  Red Cross  NGO  Nationals  Expatriates 
1997 49  20  16 13 28 21 
1998 54  24  18 12 42 12 
1999 67  12  21 34 37 30 
2000 80  31 5  44 62 18 
2001 78  25  10 54 24 13 
2002 62  15 7  40 53  9 
2003 98  24  23 51 74 24 
2004 88  15 6  67 61 27 
Source: CIC/HPG Humanitarian Security Project preliminary data set 
According to the data currently available
39, an average of 66 aid workers per year were 
victims of major violence (killed, wounded, or kidnapped) during 1997-2000, four years 
prior to the advent of GWOT and the new global security environment.  During the four 
years since, 2001-2004, the annual average was 83.  The risk to national staffers 
increased even more in the latter period, becoming three times as likely to be victims of 
violence as expatriate staff, a number that reflects their greater representation in frontline 
field work.   
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Figure 1: Short-term trend appears to show increase in risk to aid workers 
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Source: CIC/HPG Humanitarian Security Project preliminary data set 
 
A theory often cited for the apparent rise - and one which is believed deeply by certain 
aid organizations who have suspended operations as a result - is the securitization of aid 
by western governments in the global counter-terror campaign, which has created a 
political association of aid organizations with this western agenda.  Another explanation 
has militants choosing aid institutions as soft targets, for the purpose of sparking conflict 
or general disorder. Others refute the importance of the targeting issue, insisting that the 
majority of violent incidents are crimes of opportunity having nothing whatever to do 
with politics of humanitarian action and everything to do with its material resources.  
Clearly, attribution of increased risk solely to GWOT line-blurring or the sitting duck 
syndrome does not capture the full complexity of the situation, and humanitarian   30
organizations need to arm themselves with more sophisticated analysis in order to be 
credible
40 – another indication of the need for a thorough and accurate accounting.   
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Source: CIC/HPG Humanitarian Security Project preliminary data set 
 
Some in the humanitarian community have also posited a growing environment of 
impunity, spurred by such events as abuses of prisoners under GWOT, which has had the 
effect of easing pressures on allies and foes alike to respect internationally sanctioned 
principles of humane treatment and human rights.
41  It is certainly the case that when it 
comes to the killing of aid workers, governments rarely resolve or even adequately 
investigate crimes against aid workers.  One source quotes a figure of only 22 out of 214 
cases of violent deaths of UN staffers having been solved.
42   
 
It is possible that a longer-range analysis of casualty statistics may determine that 9/11 
and advent of GWOT did not represent the watershed in humanitarian security that they   31
might now seem to be.  Looking back at prior security incidents one sees a tendency to 
treat each horrific act of violence against aid workers as a turning point.  Before the UN 
and ICRC bombings in Baghdad and the upsurge of violence against international targets 
in Afghanistan there was the brutal murder of UNHCR staff in West Timor rampages in 
September 2000.  And before that, December 1996 saw the execution-style murders of 
ICRC workers as they slept in their residence in Chechnya.  All of these had the effect of 
motivating the humanitarian community to take action to enhance security measures, and 
all denoted problems in perceptions, a lack of trust, and a basic disconnect or distancing 
between the aid organizations and the community they served.  What 9/11 seems to have 
done, in countries of counter-terror concern in particular, is increase that distance.   
NGOs, traditionally the members of the humanitarian community closest to the ground, 
have decried the fact that in these places they don’t know who to talk to anymore, 
whereas before if they couldn’t speak directly to the armed parties they could at least 
communicate through intermediaries.  In Iraq and parts of Afghanistan, they 





Given the prodigious efforts and analysis devoted to humanitarianism over the past 15 
years, it seems implausible that issues of coordination, civil-military relations, 
operational security and principled programming should be thornier and more elusive 
than ever before.  Yet here we are.  Whether the challenges involve operational 
effectiveness, deeply held principles, or matters of life and limb, humanitarian actors   32
cannot hope to resolve these dilemmas in isolation. Rather, solutions will require the will 
and action of political actors in the UN and donor community as well as members of the 
development sphere. 
 
As regards the issues examined here, the following are seen as potential areas for action: 
 
1)  Preserving space for neutral humanitarian action, unfettered but narrowly defined 
Integrated missions may well be the future of UN engagement in complex emergencies or 
transitions but it must not become a de facto template, lest the costs to humanitarian 
response outweigh the benefits of strategic coordination. In instances of acute crisis or 
humanitarian need, humanitarian actors need scope to save lives and reduce suffering 
without regard to political agendas.  UN political actors should therefore be held to the 
credo of “integration when possible, independence when necessary.”  For their part, 
humanitarian and multi-mandated actors need to be much more rigorous in developing  
(and consistent in implementing) benchmarks for programming and positioning in 
situations of transition, determining if and when to shift focus and partners towards 
longer term stabilization and recovery objectives.  
 
Humanitarian actors would also do well to jointly develop an agreed definition of what 
constitutes humanitarian action.  The OECD/DAC’s current efforts to define 
humanitarian action for the purposes of transparency and harmonization in reporting 
might serve as a useful starting point for building consensus.  Both relief and 
development actors must resist the tendency to define all aid efforts as emergency   33




2)  Addressing the other gray area: assisting countries in “chronic emergencies” 
There is an urgent need for strategizing and innovative thinking around aid policy in 
protracted crises, involving both the humanitarian and development practitioners, 
political actors, and the international financial institutions.  Insofar as failed state 
scenarios have now garnered the attention of the developed world for security reasons, 
civil-military relations, particularly as regards humanitarian actors, will come to the fore.  
Recent efforts at finding common ground between military and humanitarian actors and 




3)  Rethinking security 
a.  Acknowledging and accepting risk in the humanitarian sphere 
Humanitarian action in disasters and conflict scenarios inherently involves greater risk to 
personnel than most development or diplomatic activities.  Applying universal security 
protocols to all UN personnel will effectively strip UN humanitarian agencies of their 
operationality and place them in a role more akin to donors or contracting entities.  If UN 
humanitarian actors choose to retain access and an operational role, gradated security 
structures will need to be developed, both within agencies and for the UN system as a   34
whole.  UN agencies, like NGOs would then be able to determine their own risk 
threshold, providing an “informed consent” mechanism is established for personnel, who 
would receive the additional training, equipment, and insurance provisions required for 
employment at the higher risk levels.  
 
a.  Greater security through indigenization of aid?  
It is generally agreed that that security of aid efforts is best achieved through the 
acceptance of the aiding entity by the local community.  This accepted wisdom, 
combined with the uncomfortable phenomenon of western based agencies performing 
‘aid by remote control’ in insecure areas, reinforces the need to give local organizations 
greater ownership and control of humanitarian assistance operations. This has been raised 
in humanitarian fora with new urgency of late, but beyond touting the familiar mantra of 
‘capacity building’, the humanitarian community has expended very little in the past 
toward developing indigenous response capacity for humanitarian emergencies.  Perhaps 
the security imperative will give new impetus to creating these capacities. 
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